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UNITED STATES V. O'HAGAN: THE SUPREME
COURT ABANDONS TEXTUALISM TO
ADOPT THE MISAPPROPRIATION
THEORY
Amy E. Fahey*
Introduction
In United States v. O'Hagan,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using
confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary
duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violat-
ing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1 Before O'Hagan, the Court had
limited the reach of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 19343 to the text of the statute, rather than expand it for
policy reasons.4 On June 25, 1997, however, the Court looked be-
yond the plain language of section 10(b) and decided that the mis-
appropriation theory5 would properly serve the underlying purpose
* The author wishes to thank Professor Jill Fisch, Fordham University School of
Law, for her guidance, suggestions, and critiques.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
2. See id. at 2207, 2214. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) [to] use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1997).
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for:
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1997).
4. See infra Part lI.B.
5. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. Under the misappropriation theory, a person
commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and therefore violates
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
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of the securities laws.6 This policy-based decision shocked and dis-
appointed the many commentators awaiting the Supreme Court's
resolution of this matter.7
Critics of the misappropriation theory argue that stretching crim-
inal liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not the appro-
priate way of criminalizing this type of unlawful insider trading.8
Instead, Congress should enact a statute which explicitly prohibits
insider trading and trading on misappropriated information in
breach of a fiduciary duty.9 Until the legislature acts, however, sec-
tion 10(b) should be construed narrowly to ensure consistency and
fairness.10
This Note argues that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent
with the language of section 10(b) and Supreme Court precedent,
and provides no guidance for lower courts regarding the applica-
tion of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. By holding
that "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's in-
use in the securities market, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the informa-
tion. See id.
6. See id. at 2210 ("The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)'s lan-
guage ... [and] is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to
insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence."). The
Court also held that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not exceed its
rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a), but an analysis of that decision is
beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 2214.
7. See Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court Misap-
propriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1158-59
(1997) (noting that the Supreme Court's endorsement of the misappropriation theory
"surprises many commentators, given the Court's twenty-year history of making se-
curities fraud litigation more restrictive."); Edward Felsenthal, Big Weapon Against
Insider Trading Is Upheld, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1997, at C1 ("The O'Hagan ruling
came as a surprise to many lawyers who had predicted the mostly conservative court
would balk at reading the law expansively.").
8. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It is an Inkblot We
are Expounding: Section 10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 41, 43 (1995)
(arguing that when a statute is vague, "any attempt to fashion a broader interpreta-
tion inevitably relies on the subjective and unguided preference of the judiciary rather
than the articulated guidance of the elected legislature."). Cf. Barbara Bader Aldave,
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Informa-
tion, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 121 (1984) ("The theory that one who misappropriates
confidential information deceives the person who entrusted the information to him,
and that his trading on the information causes damage to other investors, provides a
generalized explanation of why trading on nonpublic information in an impersonal
market may violate Rule 10b-5.").
9. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
10. See Grundfest, supra note 8, at 44 (arguing that the misappropriation theory is
likely to lead to inconsistent results because "[r]easonable minds can differ as to the
import of ... section 10(b) .... and honorable Justices strongly opposed to fraud in
the nation's securities markets can legitimately oppose limitless extensions of section
10(b)'s cryptic language.").
[Vol. XXV
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formation to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loy-
alty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal" and violates sec-
tion 10(b), 11 the Court left many questions unanswered. Lower
courts must now grapple with the extent to which liability can be
imposed, the types of trust relationships sufficient to give rise to
liability when a breach occurs, and the level of "connection" that is
required between the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities.
This Note examines the development of the misappropriation
theory and argues that its adoption by the Supreme Court in
O'Hagan was erroneous because it cannot be reconciled with the
language of section 10(b) or previous Supreme Court decisions,
which strictly interpreted the text of the statute. Part I provides
the background and legislative intent behind section 10(b), dis-
cusses insider trading and the misappropriation theory, and exam-
ines how the lower courts have attempted to reconcile the
misappropriation theory with the language of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Part II presents canons of statutory construction and
the Supreme Court's section 10(b) jurisprudence, focusing on the
O'Hagan case. Part III analyzes the misappropriation theory and
concludes that the Court's use of policy in interpreting the statute,
rather than the plain language of section 10(b), was improper be-
cause courts are not competent to make law in the securities mar-
kets and should instead defer this responsibility to Congress.
I. Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the Prohibition of
Unlawful Trading
While the federal securities laws do not expressly prohibit in-
sider trading, the doctrine has evolved from Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") and judicial interpretations of the
general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws,'12 in par-
ticular, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 13
11. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
12. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 184-85 (1991).
13. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 (1983) ("It is well settled that
traditional corporate 'insiders' - directors, officers and persons who have access to
confidential corporate information - must preserve the confidentiality of nonpublic
information that belongs to and emanates from the corporation.") (internal citations
omitted).
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A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
After the stock market crash in 1929, and the depressed econ-
omy that followed, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193314
("1933 Act") and the Securities and Exchange Act of 193415 ("1934
Act") to regulate the troubled securities market.1 6 The purpose of
the 1933 Act was to encourage full disclosure of information re-
garding public offerings of securities, to protect investors against
fraud, and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair deal-
ing.' 7 Through the regulation of securities transactions, the 1934
Act was designed to protect investors against the manipulation of
stock prices, and to impose regular reporting requirements on com-
panies with stock listed on national securities exchanges.'-
Pursuant to the 1934 Act, Congress created the SEC and
equipped it with flexible enforcement powers to accomplish the
statute's goals. 19 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices,2 °
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1997).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1997).
16. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976); see also Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 407-08 (1990) ("[T]he central inspiration for the Act was the com-
bination of the bull market of the 1920s and the dramatic collapse that ended it.");
Timothy J. Horman, Comment, In Defense of United States v. Bryan: Why the Misap-
propriation Theory is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2457 (1996) ("Insider
trading was one of the major abuses that Congress perceived as a cause of the 1929
crash.").
17. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
18. See id. Senator Fletcher, who was the sponsor of the 1934 Act and the Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency at the time, explained the
Act's purpose:
Manipulators who have in the past had a comparatively free hand to befud-
dle and fool the public and to extract from the public millions of dollars
through stock-exchange operations are to be curbed and deprived of the op-
portunity to grow fat on the savings of the average man and woman of
America. Under this bill the securities exchanges will not only have the ap-
pearance of an open market place for investors but will be truly open to
them, free from the hectic operations and dangerous practices which in the
past have enabled a handful of men to operate with stacked cards against the
general body of the outside investors. For example, besides forbidding
fraudulent practices and unwholesome manipulations by professional mar-
ket operators, the bill seeks to deprive corporate directors, corporate of-
ficers, and other corporate insiders of the opportunity to play the stocks of
their companies against the interests of the stockholders of their companies.
78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher), quoted in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 765 (1975).
19. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
20. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). Notably, one of the
drafters of the provision indicated:
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empowers the SEC to make rules and regulations prohibiting the
use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.2 The SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5 in 1942, pursuant to a grant of authority under section
10(b). 22 Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to "employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or to engage in any act
which operates as a "fraud or deceit ... in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
23
B. Insider Trading: The Traditional Theory
The traditional theory of insider trading liability provides that
Rule 10b-5 is violated when a person buys or sells securities based
on nonpublic information if:
(1) he owes a fiduciary or similar duty to the other party to the
transaction; (2) he is an insider of the corporation in whose
shares he trades, and thus owes a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders; or (3) he is a tippee who received his infor-
mation from an insider of the corporation and knows, or should
know, that the insider breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing the
information to him.
24
The failure to disclose material information when under a fiduciary
duty to do so, prior to trading, is a fraudulent omission, implicating
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because these provi-
sions explicitly prohibit deception and fraud in securities transac-
Of course subsection (c) [section 9(c) of H.R. 7852 - later section 10(b)] is a
catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any
objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have the authority
to deal with new manipulative devices.
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), quoted in Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S.
at 202-03.
21. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225. Section 10(b) provides that it is unlawful to
"use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997) (emphasis added).
22. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
24. Aldave, supra note 8, at 101-02. One commits Rule 10b-5 fraud only if he or
she "fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction
•.. when he [or she] is under a duty to do so." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. This duty
"does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information," but
rather arises from "a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" be-
tween the parties to the transaction. Id. at 235, 228.
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tions.25 Thus, the breach of the insider's duty to the shareholders
constitutes the "deceptive device" required by the traditional the-
ory of liability under section 10(b). 26
In 1961, in the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,2 7 the
SEC decided that a corporate insider must abstain from trading
shares of the corporation for which he works, unless he has first
disclosed all the material, inside information.28 The SEC noted
that the obligation to disclose stems, first, from the existence of a
relationship giving access to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose, and second, from the inherent unfair-
ness that exists when a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion.29 This case essentially created the "disclose or abstain" re-
quirement 30 which the Supreme Court subsequently followed.3 1
In Chiarella v. United States,32 the Supreme Court endorsed in-
sider trading liability. The Court decided that a person who had
access to confidential documents, and used this information to buy
the stock of companies that were about to become targets of take-
over bids, could be liable for violating section 10(b) if they failed to
disclose the information prior to trading.33 The defendant in
Chiarella, however, was a "complete stranger" to the transaction
because he worked for a financial printer and owed no fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of the target companies.34 The Court held
that the failure to disclose material information prior to the con-
summation of a transaction constitutes fraud only when a duty to
25. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (noting that "administrative and judicial inter-
pretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b)").
26. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
27. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
28. See id. at 911. In Cady, Roberts, the Board of Curtiss-Wright met to discuss,
among other things, the reduction of a quarterly dividend. See id. at 909. Upon ap-
proving the reduction, the board authorized transmission of the information to the
New York Stock Exchange. See id. However, there was a problem with the transmis-
sion which led to a delay of the announcement on the Dow Jones ticker tape. See id.
During a recess in the board meeting after the dividend decision was made, one of the
directors, J. Cheever Cowdin, contacted a selling broker and informed him of the
dividend cut. See id. The broker entered sell orders, and traded shares of the Curtiss-
Wright stock before the dividend announcement appeared on the Dow Jones tape.
See id.
29. See id. at 912.
30. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
31. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
32. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
33. See id. at 224, 230.
34. See id. at 224, 232-33.
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disclose exists.35 Such a duty arises, according to the Court, "when
one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confi-
dence between them.' ,,36 Because the lower courts failed to iden-
tify a relationship that could give rise to such a duty, the Court
reversed the conviction in Chiarella.37
Liability under the classical theory of insider trading is based
upon the fraud that is committed when a corporate insider trades
on nonpublic information, without prior disclosure, in breach of a
duty to the corporation.38 Several years after its Chiarella decision,
the Supreme Court addressed the scope of liability under the class-
ical theory in Dirks v. SEC.39 There, the Court held that a tippee is
liable for fraud when he knows or should have known that the tip
he received constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of a corporation.40 Dirks, a securities analyst, ob-
tained information about a fraud within an insurance company
from a former officer of the company.41 Upon investigating and
confirming the allegations, Dirks discussed this information with
35. See id. at 228.
36. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)(1976)).
37. See id. at 231-32. In its brief to the Court, the United States argued in the
alternative that Chiarella should be convicted under the misappropriation theory. See
id. at 235-36. The Court did not reject this argument, but noted that "[wie need not
decide whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted to the jury." Id. at 236.
Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, strongly objected to reversing Chiarella's
convictions.
[T]he evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella, working literally in
the shadows of the warning signs in the printshop, misappropriated - stole to
put it bluntly - valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the ut-
most confidence. He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage
by purchasing securities in the market. In my view, such conduct plainly
violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., David M. Brodsky & David J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappro-
priation Theory of Insider Trading, SB93 ALI-ABA 105, 108 (1997)
Traditionally, the duty not to trade securities on the basis of material, non-
public information concerning the issuer was premised upon the common
law duty owed by a director, officer, or controlling shareholder of a corpora-
tion to the corporation's shareholders not to gain a personal advantage
through the use of nonpublic information concerning the corporation's se-
curities. Absent such a special relationship between the "insider" and the
shareholders, there was no duty to disclose the information or abstain from
trading while in possession of inside information.
Id.; see also Fisch, supra note 12 at 187-90.
39. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
40. See id. at 661-62.
41. See id. at 648-49.
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clients and investors.42 The Court, however, found that no breach
occurred because the insider did not personally benefit from his
disclosure.43
C. The Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory is another way courts have applied
insider trading liability pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Although liability under the traditional theory tends to be limited
to corporate insiders and tippees, liability pursuant to the misap-
propriation theory has been extended to outsiders who would not
ordinarily be considered fiduciaries of the corporation in whose
stocks they trade.44 Such outsiders include lawyers, stockbrokers,
financial printers, newspaper reporters, family members, and
psychiatrists.45
Under the misappropriation theory, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 are violated when a person misappropriates material, nonpublic
information by breaching a duty which arises out of a relationship
of trust and confidence, and uses that information in a securities
transaction, regardless of whether he owes any duty to the share-
holders of the traded stock.46 Liability is based upon the principle
that it is unfair to trade securities using information that was im-
42. See id. at 649. The SEC learned of the fraud after the stock price fell from $26
per share to less than $15, prompting their own investigation. See id. at 650. The SEC
found that the analyst had aided and abetted violations of the securities laws, includ-
ing section 10(b). See id.
43. See id. at 667. The Dirks Court, applying the Cady, Roberts analysis, recog-
nized that the two elements for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation are: "(i) the exist-
ence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to
take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." Id. at 653-54 (cita-
tions omitted). Although Dirks' exposure of the insurance company's fraud led to the
liquidation of more than $16 million invested in the company, because the tipper ac-
ted in order to expose the fraud, and not to benefit personally, he breached no fiduci-
ary duty, and therefore Dirks could not be held derivatively liable. Further, there was
no expectation by Dirks' sources that he would keep their information in confidence,
and Dirks did not misappropriate the information. See id. at 665.
44. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defend-
ant, who misappropriated and traded upon material information he acquired at a
bank where he was previously employed, violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 pursu-
ant to the misappropriation theory).
45. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
diverse relationships the misappropriation theory has been applied to in other courts,
but ultimately rejecting the argument that convictions for securities fraud under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could rest on the misappropriation theory).
46. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding an employee lia-
ble for misappropriating nonpublic information regarding his employer's plan to ac-
quire another company).
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properly acquired or not intended to be used for personal gain.47
The focus, therefore, is on whether the insider breached a fiduciary
duty to any lawful possessor of nonpublic information, rather than
to the issuing company or its shareholders.48
Moreover, unlike liability imposed under the traditional theory
of insider trading, the misappropriation theory reaches persons
who are neither insiders of the companies whose shares are being
traded, nor tippees of such insiders.49 In fact, the misappropriation
theory does not even require that the buyer or seller of the securi-
ties be defrauded." Instead, the victim of the "deceptive device"
under section 10(b) must be a party to which the offending trader
owed a fiduciary duty.51 "Deception through nondisclosure" to
that party is what creates liability under the misappropriation
theory.52
The Supreme Court first discussed liability for misappropriating
information in Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella53 dissent when he
opined that, pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, "a person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.
54
While the Chief Justice conceded that there generally is no duty to
disclose unless the parties are in a fiduciary relationship, he argued
that a duty arises when unlawful means are used to gain an infor-
mational advantage, and that the failure to disclose thus constitutes
fraud.5
1. Reconciling the Misappropriation Theory with Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5
The underlying principle of the misappropriation theory is the
extension of section 10(b) liability to outsiders who unlawfully ben-
47. See Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction
to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59
ALB. L. REV. 139, 144 (1995) ("The emotional impulse that vibrates the misappropria-
tion theory seems to be a visceral dislike for asymmetric market information, espe-
cially if a person unfairly obtains such information.").
48. See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409.
49. See Aldave, supra note 8, at 111-12.
50. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
51. See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409.
52. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997) (explaining
that.-full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory, because
with disclosure, "there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation").
53. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
54. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 239-40.
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efit from material, nonpublic information, in order to protect the
source of misappropriated information, rather than the market par-
ticipants.5 6 Because the misappropriation theory is a source of lia-
bility pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the prohibited
conduct must consist of fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. 57
a. The Fraud Requirement
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to apply
the misappropriation theory, in United States v. Newman,58 when it
held that a securities trader may be held criminally liable for trad-
ing on a tip conveyed to him by two employees who misappropri-
ated the information from their investment banking firms.59
Although the employees owed no duty to the company whose
shares they traded, the court found the breach of fiduciary duty to
their employer was enough to support a Rule 10b-5 conviction.6 °
Despite the Supreme Court's holding that not every instance of
fraud violates section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,61 the Newman court
held that the mere breach of an employment relationship was ade-
quate.62 Beginning with this important decision, the Second Cir-
cuit helped develop the misappropriation theory, applying it to a
variety of situations where there was some breach of trust and
confidence.63
56. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (1995); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). Cf. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207
("The misappropriation theory is thus designed to 'protec[t] the integrity of the secur-
ities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation'").
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
58. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. See id. at 16.
60. See id. at 17. The Newman court noted that it "need spend little time on the
issue of fraud and deceit" and went on to explain that "[b]y sullying the reputations"
of the investment banking firms, Newman and his cohorts "defrauded those employ-
ers as surely as if they took their money." Id.
61. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) ("[N]ot every instance
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)."); Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977) (holding that section 10(b) violations must be
based on manipulation or deception).
62. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
63. See generally, United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953-59 (1995). In Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), which involved the same defendants and
arose out of the same conduct that gave rise to the criminal convictions in Newman
but was brought by a target corporation shareholder, the court noted that "[n]othing
in our opinion in Newman suggests that an employee's duty to 'abstain or disclose'
with respect to his employer should be stretched to encompass an employee's 'duty of
disclosure' to the general public." Id. at 13. In construing Chiarella, the court found
that section 10(b) liability could not be predicated on the misappropriation of confi-
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Courts applying the misappropriation theory easily found the
section 10(b) fraud requirement fulfilled where there was a breach
of duty to an employer,64 but have extended the theory far beyond
the employment context. For example, in United States v. Willis,
65
a psychiatrist's use of information revealed by a patient was found
to be a sufficient basis for section 10(b) liability.66 In addition, the
dential information without the breach of a fiduciary duty. See id. at 12. Later, in
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), the court addressed facts similar to those
in Chiarella, namely, that an employee at a financial printing firm learned the identity
of tender offer targets in the course of his employment and traded on such informa-
tion. Id. at 199. The court found Materia liable, holding that "one who misappropri-
ates nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty and trades on that
information to his own advantage violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 203.
Materia breached the duty he owed to his employer, thereby implicating the misap-
propriation theory, whereas the Moss court ruled that such a breach was insufficient
to give rise to section 10(b) liability. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 13. The court reconciled
Materia and Moss by distinguishing between a criminal action and a private action for
damages. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
The Second Circuit took the misappropriation theory even further in its decision in
United States v. Carpenter, when it held that Rule 10b-5 was violated when a newspa-
per columnist from the Wall Street Journal misappropriated securities-related infor-
mation that was scheduled to appear in the "Heard on the Street" column and traded
upon information contained in these upcoming columns. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024, 1026-27, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986). The court explained that while Dirks held that
certain trading by insiders or quasi-insiders violated Rule 10b-5, that is not to say that
other forms of misconduct do not implicate the Rule. See id. at 1029. Namely, the
court established that the predicate act of fraud may be committed on the source of
the nonpublic information, even though the source may be unaffiliated with the buyer
or seller of securities. See id. at 1032. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and an
equally divided Court affirmed the conviction without an opinion. See Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
64. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text. See also SEC v. Clark, 915
F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We find no linguistic reason not to apply this concep-
tion of fraud to the securities context .... [and] conclude that the misappropriation
theory fits comfortably within the meaning of 'fraud' in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
65. 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying a motion to dismiss an indictment
charging Dr. Willis, a psychiatrist, of violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
purchasing securities based on business information confided in him by a patient for
his diagnosis and treatment).
66. See id. at 274-75. Dr. Willis' patient was the wife of a corporate executive who
confided in him about her husband's efforts to become CEO of BankAmerica. See id.
at 271. Finding it "difficult to imagine a relationship that requires a higher degree of
trust and confidence than the traditional relationship of physician and patient," the
court held that, if proven, the allegations could subject Willis to the misappropriation
theory of securities fraud. Id. at 272, 275. The court reasoned that by holding himself
out "as her physician with recognized obligations of confidentiality for his patient's
secrets," and failing to advise her of his intent to profit on this confidential informa-
tion, Willis fraudulently induced her to confide in him in connection with his securities
trading. Id. at 274. The court further found that the patient had a property interest in
her psychiatric treatment, and by jeopardizing their relationship of trust and confi-
dence, Willis put at risk the patient's financial investment in the treatment. Id.
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misappropriation theory was extended to the family relationship in
United States v. Reed,67 where the court held that a son's breach of
his father's trust may give rise to liability under section 10(b).68
While the expansion of liability under the misappropriation the-
ory in the Second Circuit was significant, courts did not find the
requisite fraud in every section 10(b) case. In United States v.
Chestman,69 for example, the breach of confidence between a hus-
band and wife was not sufficient to impose liability.70 The court
went to great lengths analyzing what constitutes a fiduciary rela-
tionship and its equivalent, noting that it must be cautious in ex-
tending the misappropriation theory to new relationships.7'
67. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
68. See id. at 705. The court held that:
A person who receives confidential information from another and misappro-
priates it for personal benefit is deemed to hold the proceeds of the misap-
propriation in a constructive trust for the benefit of the entrusting party.
The misappropriator thus becomes the trustee ex maleficio, or quasi-fiduci-
ary, of the entrustor. In the context of the securities laws, it does not matter
for purposes of assessing liability whether the recipient of the information is
actually trading in the securities issued by the source of the information.
Rather, the duty is breached by the misappropriation and resulting profit,
and a constructive trust attaches.
Id. at 700 (citations omitted).
69. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
70. See id. at 571. Keith Loeb, the husband of a member of the Waldbaum family,
was told by his wife that the company was being sold and was cautioned not to tell
anyone so as not to risk ruining the sale. See id at 555. However, Loeb told his
stockbroker, Chestman, who traded on that information, knowing of Loeb's relation
to the Waldbaum corporation. See id. In the Chestman opinion, the court recognized
that it broke ranks with its Carpenter decision, since it was the first fact pattern it
considered that "is clearly beyond the pale of the traditional theory of insider trad-
ing." Id. at 566-67. In the end, the court concluded that there was not enough evi-
dence to establish a fiduciary relationship or a similar relationship of trust and
confidence between Loeb and the Waldbaum family, and therefore held that he did
not defraud them by disclosing the information to Chestman. See id. at 570-71. Be-
cause Loeb had committed no fraud, Chestman could not be held derivatively liable
as Loeb's tippee or as an aider and abettor under the misappropriation theory. See id.
at 571.
71. See id. at 567-71. In evaluating what constitutes a fiduciary relationship, the
Chestman court looked first to associations that the common law has recognized as
inherently fiduciary:
Counted among these hornbook fiduciary relations are those existing be-
tween attorney and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal
and agent, trustee and trust beneficiary, and senior corporate official and
shareholder.
Id. at 568. Noting that this is not an exhaustive list, the court held that a breach of a
similar relationship of trust and confidence, which must share the same qualities of a
fiduciary relationship, also implicates the misappropriation theory. See id. at 658.
Analyzing the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, the Chestman court found
that "'at the heart of the fiduciary relationship' lies 'reliance, and de facto control and
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b. The "In Connection With" Requirement
Not only must fraud exist for the misappropriation theory to ap-
ply, but the fraud must be "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of securities. 2 When the Supreme Court addressed this issue
with respect to traditional insider trading, it rejected the notion
that every fraud or breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate insider
to shareholders constituted securities fraud. 3 Nevertheless, when
discussing this element in United States v. Newman, 4 the Second
Circuit easily found satisfied the "in connection with" requirement
of Rule 10b-5 because Newman's fraud "touched" the securities
transaction.7 ' Generally, once courts identify fraud sufficient to
give rise to section 10(b) liability, they also find the "in connection
with" requirement satisfied due to the self-evident nexus that exists
between the two components in these cases.7 6
Although the Second Circuit has the most experience interpret-
ing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, other circuits have addressed the
issue of whether the misappropriation theory is consistent with the
statute.7 By the time the issue reached the Supreme Court, the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits had held that criminal liability under
section 10(b) may not be predicated on the misappropriation the-
dominance."' Id. (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir.
1982).
72. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not proscribe all frauds occurring in the business world, but only those
'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' In other words, the fraud
must somehow 'touch' upon securities transactions.").
73. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-38 (1975)
(holding that defrauded investors who did not trade because of a misrepresentation
do not have standing to bring a private damage action under Rule 10b-5).
74. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
75. See id. at 18 (citing Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)). The Newman Court improperly'characterized the "pur-
chaser or sellers" portion of the text as a mere standing requirement. See id. at 17.
76. See, e.g., Clark, 915 F.2d at 449 ("Purely as a matter of linguistic construction,
we have little trouble concluding that there is" some nexus between the misappropria-
tion and the subsequent trading); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1986). See also SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We agree that
buying or selling securities 'in connection with' fraud perpetrated on an employer to
obtain material non-public information constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5"); SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding the suggestion that the fraud was
not "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities is "inimical to the letter
and spirit of the expansive scheme created to combat fraud in the securities markets.
The information Materia stole has no value whatsoever except 'in connection with' his
subsequent purchase of securities.").
77. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995); Cherif, 933 F.2d at 408; Clark, 915
F.2d at 442; Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985).
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ory,78 while the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held that it
could.79
II. Interpreting Section 10(b)
Statutes are typically written in general terms because they are
invariably products of political compromise. 8° As a result, it is
often up to the judiciary to determine the legislative intent and
meaning of statutes in a particular case.8' Principles of statutory
interpretation fix the limits of a statute's reach, and thus the out-
come of a particular decision depends a great deal upon which ca-
non of statutory interpretation a court employs.82
A. Canons of Construction
When courts look to a statute to determine the scope of liability,
they often use tools of statutory interpretation and construction to
ascertain the meaning of the language.83 The four main schools of
statutory interpretation are: textualism, intentionalism, purposiv-
ism, and the dynamic theory.84 While the Supreme Court has al-
most consistently interpreted section 10(b) using a textual or plain
language approach8 5 the other canons of construction are also ac-
ceptable methods of interpreting statutes. 86
1. Textualism
Textualism requires courts to rely strictly on the language of a
statute to ascertain its meaning.87 Proponents of this method con-
78. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
79. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991); Cherif, 933
F.2d at 410; Clark, 915 F.2d at 453. The Third Circuit has also seemingly adopted the
misappropriation theory. See Rothberg, 771 F.2d at 822 (finding that one "violates the
insider trading rule when he uses insider information in violation of the fiduciary duty
owed to the corporation to which hew owes a duty of confidentiality.").
80. See Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 47, at 140.
81. See id.
82. See Steven A. Meetre, Textualist Statutory Interpretation Kills Section 10(b)
"Aiding and Abetting" Liability, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 58, 60 (1996) ("Often it is a court's
interpretation of the [statute's] language that determines the application and effect of
legislation.").
83. See id.
84. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 10
(Harvard University Press ed. 1994). These statutory tools are not mutually exclusive.
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 14.
87. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy
and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 237 (1997) ("'Textualists'
contend that the only democratically legitimate source of meaning is the actual statu-
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tend that the plain meaning of the text is a reasonable indication of
the legislature's intent.88 This approach requires a court interpret-
ing a statute to confine itself to a literal reading of the text, unless
the text is ambiguous on its face, or such a reading would lead to an
"absurd" or "bizarre" result.8 9
Critics of the plain language approach to interpreting section
10(b), like Melvin Aron Eisenberg, argue that the approach is in-
tellectually incoherent because of the difficulty in identifying ca-
nonical statutory text.9° Eisenberg explains that strict textualists
do not necessarily confine the canonical text to the statutory provi-
sions at issue and, as a result, widen the text to include the entire
law or even all statutes adopted by the relevant legislature.91
Moreover, even if strict textualism were coherent, Eisenberg ar-
gues that judges have an obligation to be faithful servants of the
legislature, and using this methodology violates the obligation.92
Despite these criticisms, most courts rely on textualism in inter-
preting section 10(b).93 In addition, the Supreme Court generally
interprets all statutes based upon their plain meaning.94  The
Supreme Court has emphasized that where the language of the
statute is plain, the sole function of a court is to enforce a statute
according to its terms.95 Although the legislative history of a stat-
tory text, not any underlying ideas, intentions or purposes that have not cleared the
hurdles of democratic lawmaking."); Meetre, supra note 82, at 60 (1996).
88. See Meetre, supra note 82, at 60.
89. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13 (1995).
90. See id. at 14, 22.
91. See id. at 22-23. Eisenberg explains that because the particular provision at
issue is often part of a larger statute, or is in a statute that is one of a group of related
statutes, "strict textualism cannot sensibly restrict the relevant text to the statutory
provision directly at issue. Once that fateful line is crossed, however, there is no logi-
cal stopping point until the limit of the text of all law is reached." Id. He further
argues that if the relevant text is the text of all law, then strict textualism makes the
outrageous suggestion that the legislature must have had the text of all law in mind
when it enacted the particular provision. See id. at 23.
92. See id. at 37. "[I]n the domain of federal law Congress is the master and the
Court is merely a servant." Id. Accordingly, "like any servant, a court is bound to
give the instructions it receives from its master-statutes-a reasonable interpretation
.... [which] always depends on all the contextual circumstances, not just on a literal
reading of the text." Id.
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
95. See West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991). In
addressing the argument that the congressional purpose of enacting a statute must
prevail over the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, the Court held that when a
statute "contains a phrase that is unambiguous - that has a clearly accepted meaning
in both legislative and judicial practice - we do not permit it to be expanded or con-
tracted . . ."
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ute may clarify ambiguous provisions, "courts have no authority to
enforce alleged principles gleaning solely from legislative history
that has no statutory reference point."96 Thus, the Court has held
that statutory construction must always begin with the language of
the statute.97 When the language is clear, judicial inquiry into the
statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances,
is finished.98 According to this view, a court's limited role is simply
to apply a statute because Congress alone has the authority to
make law.99
2. Intentionalism
A second tool of statutory interpretation is intentionalism. This
method treats a statute as a static text, and "asks how the legisla-
ture originally intended the interpretive question to be answered,
or would have intended the question to be answered had it thought
about the issue when it passed the statute."'100 To ascertain intent,
the court may look beyond the text to the statute's legislative his-
tory. 10 1 Proponents of the misappropriation theory often apply in-
tentionalism, arguing that the policies underlying the theory are
consistent with the intent of the legislators who enacted section
10(b).102
96. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d
697, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
97. See Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1922) (using textualism
to hold that forfeiture provisions of a statute apply to a worker whose employer is
neither paying compensation nor is subject to an order to pay under the statute at the
time the worker settles with a third party).
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 499 U.S. at 101 ("[I]t is our role to make
sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.").
100. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479-80 (1987).
101. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 14. Despite this inquiry into intent, the actual
legislative intent is rarely brought to light from the historical record. See id. at 16.
102. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that while "it
would be disingenuous to suggest that in 1942 the SEC sanctioned or even foresaw
the use of the misappropriation theory .... its apparent understanding that Congress
empowered it to draft a rule to address unforeseen species of fraud squares with our
reading of § 10(b)'s contemporaneous legislative history."); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1986) (justifying the broad-reaching legislative intent
of the 1934 Act in adopting the misappropriation theory); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the antifraud provision of the 1.934 Act was in-
tended to be broad in scope, and was not "aimed solely at the eradication of fraudu-
lent trading by corporate insiders.").
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3. Purposivism
Another alternative is purposivism, which allows a court to con-
sider the congressional purpose or policy behind the statute's en-
actment. 10 3 Using this approach, the purpose or objective of the
statute must first be identified, then the statutory ambiguities can
be resolved by determining which interpretation is most consistent
with that purpose or goal.10 4 Purposivism looks to Congress' in-
tent in regulating an area, rather than its intent in enacting a partic-
ular statute.10 5 As opposed to intentionalism, purposivism allows a
statute to evolve to address new issues, while maintaining a con-
nection with the original legislative expectations. 0 6 Notwithstand-
ing this broader inquiry, it remains difficult under either approach
to identify the purpose of a statute because legislatures do not al-
ways set forth the reasons for a law's enactment.10 7 Moreover, be-
cause statutes are products of compromise, legislative histories
often support divergent intentions.0 8 Finally, this method calls for
courts rather than Congress to make policy judgments, 0 9 and may
ignore the plain meaning of a statute. 1 0
4. The Dynamic Theory
The dynamic theory is a tool of statutory interpretation that has
received considerable scholarly debate in recent years.1 ' The dy-
namic theory suggests that courts should consider current policies
and societal values in rendering decisions.1 12 Proponents of this
103. See Meetre, supra note 82, at 60; see generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 25-
34.
104. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 25-26.
105. See Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good
Judging Under a Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133 (1997). In distinguishing the ca-
nons of construction, this commentator noted:
A purposivist judge finds law by measuring a statute's language against the
statute's purpose. For the task of discerning purpose, legislative history is a
common choice. An intentionalist finds law by reconstructing congressional
intent, also frequently relying on legislative history. Intentionalism differs
from purposivism because a statute can be interpreted to have a broader
purpose beyond the one intended.
Id. at 1133.
106. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 84 at 26.
107. See id. at 27.
108. See id.
109. See Meetre, supra note 82, at 61 (noting that both purposivism and intentional-
ism enable activist judges to "'rewrite' statutes to address matters").
110. See id.
111. See generally Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74
N.C. L. REV. 585, 614-33 (1996). See also Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 87, at 234 n.1.
112. "Under dynamic theory, 'the court's role is to reach the best result, formally
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tool argue that "[i]nterpretation is not an archeological discovery,
but a dialectic creation. 11 3 Statutes should not be treated as static
texts because gaps and ambiguities always exist.114 Instead, stat-
utes should be interpreted dynamically, allowing them to evolve
with current policies and perspectives.115
B. Interpreting Section 10(b)
In interpreting the language of section 10(b), the Supreme Court
has generally employed textualism, reading the plain language of
the statute to determine the meaning of the text.'1 6 Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder17 is an exemplary case in which the Court decided
whether section 10(b) reaches negligent conduct, or whether a de-
fendant must act with an intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud." 8 Relying on the language of section 10(b), specifically the
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction with "de-
vice or contrivance," the Court held that the scope of section 10(b)
liability does not extend to negligent conduct.11 9 Accordingly, the
Court refused to consider any policy arguments in reaching its
decision. 120
unconstrained (though perhaps influenced or persuaded) by the statute's text and leg-
islative history." Meetre, supra note 82, at 61 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Poli-
tics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988)).
113. Eskridge, supra note 100, at 1482 (citation omitted).
114. See id. at 1480.
115. See id. at 1483.
116. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
117. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
118. Id. at 187-88 (1976). Ernst & Ernst involves an accounting firm charged with
negligence for allegedly failing to conduct proper audits of a company keeping fraud-
ulent escrow account. See id. at 190.
119. See id. at 197-98.
120. See id. at 198-99. Declining to entertain the policy concerns expressed by the
SEC, the Court noted that "apart from where its logic might lead, the Commission
would add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning." Id. On the contrary, the Court steadfastly refused to
partake in judicial legislation. The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment several
times in the past. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 367 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Congress, rather than the Federal
Judiciary, has the responsibility for making the policy determinations. . . "); Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 ("When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipula-
tion and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no
more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to
negligent conduct."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748
(1975) ("[T]he Judiciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred
because of any disagreement it might have with Congress about the wisdom of creat-
ing so expansive a liability.").
1998] MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 525
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,121 the Supreme Court again
employed textualism and declined to extend liability based on pol-
icy considerations because "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no indi-
cation that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception.' 12 2 Therefore, the Court held that a
breach of a fiduciary duty without any deception, misrepresenta-
tion, or nondisclosure does not give rise to liability under section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5.
Similarly, the Court strictly interpreted section 10(b) in its recent
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 2 3 deci-
sion. Addressing the seemingly resolved issue of whether a private
right of action for aiding and abetting could be brought pursuant to
section 10(b), l2 4 the Court held that because the statute's plain lan-
guage did not create or impose such liability, it did not exist. 25
121. 430 U.S, 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Court considered a section 10(b) suit
brought by minority shareholders against majority shareholders and a firm which had
appraised the value of a stock for purposes of a Delaware short-form merger. See id.
at 466-67. Because the minority shareholders could either accept the price offered or
reject it and seek appraisal in the Delaware Court of Chancery, the transaction was
neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore did not violate section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5. See id. at 474.
122. Id. at 473.
123. 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) ("With respect ... [to] the scope of conduct prohib-
ited by § 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision.").
124. The dissenting opinion noted that "[i]n hundreds of judicial and administrative
proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have con-
cluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."
Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). However, the Court was not
persuaded by the fact that all eleven courts of appeals had recognized aiding and
abetting liability. See id. Acknowledging that aiding and abetting should be actiona-
ble in certain circumstances, the Court would not budge. "The issue . . . is not
whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but
whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute." Id. at 177. The Court de-
clared that "[p]olicy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and
structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence
to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not
have intended it." Id. at 188 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191
(1991)).
Similarly, when the Fourth Circuit was confronted with the policy justifications for
adopting the misappropriation theory, it responded:
[I]n securities law, as in all areas of the law, our perceptions of what is wise
or fair are ultimately of no relevance. In the end, we, as judges, no less than
anyone else, are bound by the actual prohibitions enacted by Congress. It is
adherence to this fundamental limitation on our own authority that leads us
to conclude that, as ignoble as Bryan's conduct was, it simply was not con-
duct that is prohibited by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 959 (1995).
125. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. Because the language of section 10(b) does
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In all of these cases,.the Supreme Court determined the scope of
section 10(b) by analyzing the language of the statute and its rela-
tively sparse legislative history. 126 Until United States v. O'Hagan,
the Court focused solely on the plain meaning of the statute and
consistently held that fraud is the critical component of section
10(b) liability.2 7 In O'Hagan, the Court's steadfast refusal to ex-
pand the scope of the statute beyond what the language permits
ended.
C. United States v. O'Hagan
The Supreme Court directly discussed the validity of the misap-
propriation theory in O'Hagan.128 The Court decided that James
O'Hagan, a lawyer, violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he
traded stocks using confidential client information he learned while
working as a partner at a law firm.129 Following an investigation by
not mention aiding and abetting, the Court held that "[i]t is inconsistent with settled
methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohib-
ited by the statutory text." Id. Rather, "ascertainment of congressional intent with
respect to the scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act
must rest primarily on the language of that section." Id. at 175 (quoting Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988)). Based upon this straightforward analysis, the Court
found that there can be no aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b). See id. at
177. The Court went on to note that if the statute itself does not resolve the case, as it
did here, it must attempt "to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the
issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act."'
Id. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance, 508 U.S. 286,
294 (1993)).
126. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) ("Neither the in-
tended scope of § 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are
revealed explicitly in the 1934 Act...").
127. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) ("Section 10(b) is
aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud."); Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) ("The language of § 10(b) gives no indica-
tion that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception.").
128. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
129. See id. at 2205. James O'Hagan was a partner at the law firm of Dorsey &
Whitney. See id. at 2205. In July 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand Met")
retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel regarding a potential tender offer for the
common stock of the Pillsbury Company, headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
a transaction which did not involve O'Hagan. See id. The firm, which was also lo-
cated in Minneapolis, severed the relationship with Grand Met in September, in light
of its policy against representing a company involved in a hostile takeover of a local
corporation. See id. In August 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney still represented Grand
Met, O'Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock, and by the end of
September, he had gathered 2,500 Pillsbury call option contracts, and owned approxi-
mately 5000 shares of Pillsbury common stock. See id. On October 4, 1988, Grand
Met announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock, and the price per share immedi-
ately increased from $39 to $60. See id. O'Hagan subsequently purchased the stock
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the SEC and other federal law enforcement agencies, O'Hagan was
charged and convicted of fifty-seven counts of mail fraud, securities
fraud, and money laundering, and sentenced to forty-one months'
imprisonment. 130  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed
O'Hagan's convictions, holding that the misappropriation theory is
not a valid basis upon which to impose criminal liability under sec-
tion 10(b). 31
1. The Eighth Circuit's Analysis
The Eighth Circuit, in O'Hagan, found that the misappropriation
theory was at odds with the explicit language of section 10(b).132
Relying on the Supreme Court's prior readings of the statute, the
Eighth Circuit defined deception as the making of a material mis-
representation or nondisclosure of material information in viola-
tion of a duty to disclose.1 33 The court then decided that deception
was critical to section 10(b) liability and, therefore, the misappro-
priation theory was problematic because it did not require any mis-
representation or nondisclosure in breach of a duty.1 34 Moreover,
the court reasoned that although the misappropriation theory does
not require deception as mandated by section 10(b), even if it did,
"it renders nugatory the requirement that the 'deception' be 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."" 35
at the lower price by exercising his call options, then sold all of his shares for a profit
of over $4,000,000. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 2206.
132. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) ("By its very
definition . . . [the misappropriation theory] does not require either a material mis-
representation or nondisclosure."). The court borrowed heavily from the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision, in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), which concluded
that "neither the language of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court authority
interpreting these provisions, nor the purposes of these securities fraud prohibitions,
will support convictions resting on the particular theory of misappropriation adopted
by our sister circuits." Id. at 944.
133. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
134. See id. (relying on Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470-76
(1977), the court noted that the Supreme Court had already rejected a lower court's
reading of section 10(b) which required no misrepresentation or nondisclosure); see
also Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994), cited in O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618 (reiterating this principle); see also supra
notes 123-25.
135. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617. In Bryan,.the Fourth Circuit found that the misap-
propriation theory "artificially divides into two discrete requirements - a fiduciary
breach and a purchase or sale of securities - the single indivisible requirement of
deception upon the purchaser or seller of securities, or upon some other person inti-
mately linked with or affected by a securities transaction." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 (em-
phasis in original). Further developing this analysis, the O'Hagan court explained
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2. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's argument that
the misappropriation theory did not satisfy section 10(b)'s decep-
tion requirement. The Court explained that the duty breached
under the misappropriation theory is a duty which runs to the
source of information.136 In addition, the O'Hagan Court limited
liability under the misappropriation theory by holding that full dis-
closure will foreclose the liability of someone who breaches a rela-
tionship of trust.137 If the fiduciary discloses his plans to trade on
that the misappropriation theory improperly "permits liability for a breach of duty
owed to individuals who are unconnected to and perhaps uninterested in a securities
transaction, thus rendering meaningless the 'in connection with . . . ' statutory lan-
guage." O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618. Thus, "the Misappropriation Theory separates the
inseparable . . . [and] disregards the specific statutory requirement of deception, in
favor of a requirement of a mere fiduciary breach[.]" David Cowan Bayne, S.J., In-
sider Trading: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory - And Thereafter, 41 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 625, 637 (1997); see also Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 138.
Brodsky and Kramer argue:
By severing the link between the fraud (breach of duty) and the securities
trade at issue, the misappropriation theory brings within its scope parties
who have no connection with issuers or their shareholders and is premised
upon breaches of duty that have nothing to do with securities markets. It
creates irrational distinctions, where some familial, employment or profes-
sional relationships creates a duty to disclose or refrain from trading,
whereas others (ones where the expectations of trust are deemed dimin-
ished) do not.
Id. However, the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella, Dirks and Central Bank
show that these requirements cannot be separated. The breach must be to parties in a
relationship of trust and confidence in order to give rise to section 10(b) liability. See
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618. In Chiarella, the Court held that a duty to disclose arises
only "from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."
Chiarella v. Unites States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). Similarly, in Dirks, the Court
stated that "'[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties ...
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market."' Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
231-32 n.14).
136. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). "A fiduciary who
'[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's informa-
tion for personal gain,' . . . 'dupes' or defrauds the principal." Id. at 2208 (quoting
Brief for the United States 17). The Court did not adopt the version of the theory
originally proposed by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, which would impose a disclo-
sure obligation to all those with whom the misappropriator trades, but rather limited
the disclosure obligation to the source of information. See id. at 2208 n.6. Under
Burger's version of the theory, "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic infor-
mation has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
137. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. The Court noted that:
full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Be-
cause the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feign-
ing fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the
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the nonpublic information to the source of. the information, then
there exists neither any purported fidelity to the source nor a "de-
ceptive device" to give rise to section 10(b) liability.138
The Supreme Court also found satisfied the requirement that the
misappropriator's deceptive use of information be "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security," because the fraud occurs
only when securities are bought or sold in the market. 139 The
Court reasoned that if the fiduciary used the nonpublic information
in ways not involving trading on the securities market, no section
10(b) violation would exist. 4
III. O'Hagan Dissected
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's interpre-
tation that Chiarella, 4I Dirks,42 and Central Bank 43 held that sec-
tion 10(b) liability cannot be predicated on a duty owed to the
source of nonpublic information.144  Attempting to distinguish
source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'de-
ceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation...
Id.
138. See id. at 2209. However, "the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable
under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty." Id.
139. Id. ("[T]he fiduciary's fraud is consummated not when [he learns the] informa-
tion, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses [it] to purchase or sell
securities.").
140. See id. "The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving
confidential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such
information through securities transactions." Id. Asserting that this is another limita-
tion on the forms of fraud section 10(b) reaches, the Court gave an example of a
situation where the misappropriation theory would not apply: a person who de-
frauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and then used
the proceeds from the fraud to purchase securities would not give rise to section 10(b)
liability since "'the proceeds would have value to the malefactor apart from their use
in a securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon as the money was
obtained."' Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 24 n.13, O'Hagan). The dissent
found this analysis to be very troubling. "[I]t becomes plain that the majority's expla-
nation of how the misappropriation theory supposedly satisfies the 'in connection
with' requirement is incomplete. The touchstone required for an embezzlement to be
'use[d] or employ[ed], in connection with' a securities transaction is not merely that it
'coincide' with, or be consummated by, the transaction, but that it is necessarily and
only consummated by the transaction." Id. at 2222 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original). The Court concluded that the misappropriation theory squares with the
language of section 10(b) requiring deception "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." See id. at 2210.
141. 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
142. 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
143. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Against this
venerable body of law, the misappropriation theory, which allows the imposition of
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these cases, the Court stated that although it declined to find liabil-
ity on "so broad a theory" in Chiarella, its decision did not limit
liability to the relationship between a corporation's insiders and
shareholders.'45 Similarly, the Dirks decision did not foreclose lia-
bility under the misappropriation theory because the information
at issue was not improperly acquired or misused.146 Finally, under
its Central Bank decision, the Supreme Court held that there is no
private right of action for aiding and abetting liability under section
10(b), but cautioned that secondary actors may still be liable under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for certain conduct. 47 Accordingly,
the Court found no inconsistencies between the misappropriation
theory and its previous decisions. 48
Rather than continue to limit the reach of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the O'Hagan Court extended the prohibition of trading on
material, nonpublic information. However, if the O'Hagan deci-
sion is consistent with previous cases, as the Court suggests, why is
this result so different? The answer lies in the canon of construc-
tion employed by the O'Hagan Court. The majority was persuaded
that the misappropriation theory is "well-tuned to an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets
and thereby promote investor confidence."' 49 The O'Hagan deci-
sion, therefore, was not reached using textualism, but rather,
purposivism:
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation
of trading on misappropriated information, and the congres-
sional purposes underlying § 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold
a lawyer like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law
firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works
§ 10(b) liability even though no market participant was deceived or defrauded, cannot
be defended.").
145. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211-12 (noting that the Court declined to find the
defendant liable because the misappropriation theory had not been submitted to thejury, but in fact, four Justices found merit in it).
146. See id. at 2213; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
147. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213. In Central Bank, the Court stated: "Any
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller
of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming ... the
requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met." Central Bank, 511 U.S.
at 191 (emphasis added). The O'Hagan Court explained that the Eighth Circuit im-
properly understood this passage to mean that only deceptive statements or omissions
on which purchasers, sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely are covered
by section 10(b). O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
148. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213-14.
149. Id. at 2210.
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
for a law firm representing the bidder.15°
A. The Methodology of Purposivism in O'Hagan
By the time it considered O'Hagan, the Supreme Court had ad-
dressed the scope of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
a number of cases using a textualist approach.'51 The O'Hagan
Court, however, rendered its decision based on policy reasons, us-
ing a purposivist approach. Although it arguably may be proper to
impose liability on those who misappropriate confidential informa-
tion, the misappropriation theory is not the proper means because
it requires an overly broad interpretation of the language of section
10(b). Moreover, when a statute is written in vague and uncertain
terms, it should be construed as narrowly as possible, to avoid in-
consistent results.152
1. Proponents of the Misappropriation Theory Advocate a
Purposivist Approach
After the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, 5 3 the mis-
appropriation theory received a great deal of scholarly debate, with
many judges and commentators advocating both intentionalism
and purposivism as approaches to interpreting section 10(b). 154
The misappropriation theory has gained judicial favor because our
country values so highly the securities market that courts will go to
great lengths to protect people's confidence in it.155
Proponents argue that the misappropriation theory is consistent
with the underlying purpose behind the securities laws. 56 When
150. Id. at 2210-11 (emphasis added).
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See Grundfest, supra note 8, at 42-45.
153. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
154. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e
think that the application of the misappropriation theory herein promotes the pur-
poses and policies underlying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); Aldave supra note 8, at
122 ("The misappropriation theory... comports well with our intuition about what is
wrong with trading on nonpublic information.").
155. See Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and
the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1988) (discussing the
nexus between insider trading and investor confidence).
156. The securities laws were created in order to regulate the troubled securities
markets and to restore peoples confidences in them. See Thel, supra note 16, at 425;
Aldave, supra note 8, at 122-23 (stating that in order to maintain the integrity of the
securities market, it. must remain fair, as "no one likes to play a game with an oppo-
nent who has a loaded dice."). Aldave, whose analysis the Supreme Court relied on
in O'Hagan, explained that "[w]e think that those who have special access to informa-
tion, because of employment or other relationships, should be barred from using that
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Congress enacted section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act, it did so for the purpose of protecting purchasers and sellers of
securities.157 Thus, proponents urge that the misappropriation the-
ory is in accord with the statute's goal, because "Congress chose to
enact a comprehensive yet open-ended statutory scheme, capable
of ongoing adaptation and refinement.' 1 58 The misappropriation
theory may also be accepted under purposivism because it ad-
vances the policy of basic fairness. 59
2. Purposivism Is Not the Appropriate Tool for Interpreting
Section 10(b)
The Supreme Court's purposivist approach in O'Hagan is not an
appropriate method of interpreting section 10(b). Instead, courts
should rely on textualism alone because liability under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 risks being expanded without limit, leaving
investors as well as the courts without a clear understanding of pro-
hibited conduct.' 60
information to gain an advantage over the rest of us." Id. Aldave concluded that
"[t]he Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory would produce results consis-
tent with our notions of fairness..." Id. at 124.
Interestingly, Rule lOb-5 itself was hastily created to address a situation where the
president of a corporation who misinformed the shareholders of the condition of the
corporation subsequently purchased the shares of the company from the shareholders
at depressed prices. The general unfairness of this event led to the drafting and adop-
tion of the rule in one day, with the Commissioner's explanation: "Well, we are
against fraud, aren't we?" See Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 110.
157. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1995).
158. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984). The repeated use of the
word "any" evidences the intention of Congress to draft the rule broadly. See Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). In fact, when it passed
the Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, and the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677, Congress found the misappropriation theory to be consistent with section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 452 (9th Cir. 1990). Section
10(b) was intended to be broad in scope, encompassing all "manipulative and decep-
tive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function." S. REP. No.
792, at 6 (1934).
159. In United States v. Carpenter, the Second Circuit explained that "the applica-
tion of the misappropriation theory herein promotes the purposes and policies under-
lying Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029
(2d Cir. 1986).
160. See Grundfest, supra note 8, at 41-43. Grundfest compares poorly drafted stat-
utes, particularly section 10(b), to an inkblot in a Rorschach test, which is a series of
inkblots used in psychiatric analysis, where the patient describes the images evoked
by the inkblots and the analyst interprets the patients descriptions. The inkblots
themselves have no intrinsic meaning. See id. "When a statute presents itself as an
inkblot, it should be construed as narrowly as practicable lest it become a breeding
ground for competing judicial imaginations." Id. at 42. Grundfest found the federal
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The Court may find it necessary to interpret the securities laws
flexibly because regulating the securities industry has become in-
creasingly difficult as technological advances and communication
systems have become more sophisticated. 161 Unfortunately, Con-
gress has not been able to keep up with new problems as they have
evolved. Thus, by using a purposivist approach to interpret section
10(b), the Court can remedy any problems by advancing the under-
lying purpose of the securities laws, which is to promote ethical
standards in the securities market and to protect investors from
fraud.1 6
2
Purposivism creates a problem, however. First, it permits courts
to legislate on a case-by-case basis without the benefit of congres-
sional hearings, or the accountability of elected legislative officials.
This, of course, offends the traditional role of the courts, which is
limited to interpreting the laws that the legislature enacts.
Although courts certainly have considerable discretion in interpret-
ing statutes, judicial activism without deference to Congress is not
appropriate.
Second, there will be no limit to the scope of liability under sec-
tion 10(b) if courts can look to merely the purpose of enacting the
securities law, and in particular section 10(b), to be extremely ambiguous, thereby
enabling judges who strongly oppose fraud in the securities markets to extend the
language of section 10(b) without limit. See id. at 44. He found the great ambiguity to
be evidenced by the number of times the Court has split 5-4 in cases interpreting
federal securities law. See id. at 45, 48-55. Grundfest criticizes the intentionalist ap-
proach to interpreting section 10(b), given the instability of congressional intent over
time. See id. at 57.
Intentionalists thus confront the uncomfortable problem that, if they look to
the intent of the Congress that in 1934 enacted section 10(b) they find no
guidance, but if they look to the intent of subsequent Congresses they can
infer sharply conflicting guidance depending on where their intentionalist
time machines stop along the way.
Id. at 58.
161. See Bevis Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of its Past and
Future, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1610 (1983) ("The growing internationalization of
the securities markets will pose another challenge for the Commission in the coming
years. As advances in communications technology make the situs of trading in securi-
ties less important, the Commission will face increasing difficulty in ensuring that its
investor protections reach all transaction in world class securities effected by or for
the benefit of U.S. citizens."); Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of
Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Impli-
cations for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 328 (1991) (book review) ("Ad-
vances in technology will continue to increase the globalization of the securities
markets .... [and] [t]he globalization of securities creates new challenges for securities
regulators around the world.").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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law. Given the broad purposes and goals of the 1934 Act,'1 63 it is
obvious that a purposivist approach may be overreaching. 164 Fur-
ther, interpreting the statute in such a way will have the effect of
making liability for trading securities unpredictable.
While the issue of statutory interpretation is certainly un-
resolved, it is anomalous for the Court suddenly to shift gears after
using textualism to interpret section 10(b) for over twenty years.1 65
The Court's sudden shift in its method of interpreting section 10(b)
may be explained by the fact that fairness is a particularly impor-
tant principle in securities trading, and as many tools as possible
are needed to protect the markets. The purposivist argument1 66 is
understandable when applied to the facts of O'Hagan because, if a
strict textual reading of section 10(b) would free someone as culpa-
ble as O'Hagan, then textualism must be improper. This argument
is unconvincing, however, because it enables courts, instead of
Congress, to make laws, which is a clear violation of the separation
of powers. 67
The Supreme Court should refrain from policy-making, and in-
terpret section 10(b) according to its plain language. 68 By finding
that liability under this statute may be predicated on the misappro-
priation theory, the Court contradicted its own precedent, and sub-
stituted its own policy judgments for the letter of the law.1 69
163. See id.
164. For example, under a purposivist approach, Dirks would probably have been
found guilty of violating section 10(b), despite the absence of a breach of duty, be-
cause a court would likely find that his conduct conflicted with the goal of promoting
ethical standards in the market despite his effort to expose a fraud. See Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983); supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part II.B. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court held that "[i]n
addressing [the question of whether negligent conduct is a basis for 10(b) liability], we
turn first to the language of § 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself."' Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
756 (1975)).
166. See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) ("It
would ... be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for this
Court to use its power.., to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined
to prohibit.") (Marshall, J., concurring).
168. See Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading: Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 835 (1997) ("Sim-
ply stated, absent a well-articulated legislative record specifically addressing the pro-
vision and question at issue, which is simply not the case with respect to insider
trading under section 10(b), textualism directs judicial interpretation of the securities
laws.").
169. As proponents of the misappropriation theory suggest, Congress enacted sec-
tion 10(b) in order to proscribe a broad range of fraudulent conduct in connection
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
B. The Misappropriation Theory is Inconsistent with Section
10(b)
The misappropriation theory, as adopted by the Supreme Court
in O'Hagan, permits liability absent the requisite "fraud" and "in
connection with" requirements of section 10(b). Despite the
Court's policy arguments, the misappropriation theory, as a matter
of law, does not satisfy the statutory requirements.
1. The Misappropriation Theory Permits Liability Absent Fraud
First, the misappropriation theory does not satisfy the fraud re-
quirement of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Many commentators
and judges suggest that the misappropriation theory does not fit
easily into a traditional fraud analysis because the breach is not
between an insider and the shareholders of a corporation. 170 While
the Supreme Court in O'Hagan found that liability under this the-
ory is limited when a fiduciary discloses the information,17' in many
cases, "early disclosure of the misappropriated information would
have only further harmed the person or entity to whom the duty
was owed. 1
72
Although many courts have adopted the misappropriation the-
ory, 73 the Eighth Circuit is not alone in its unfavorable interpreta-
with the purchase or sale of securities. It bears remembering that the language of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not even cover traditional insider trading. See Fisch,
supra note 12, at 187-99 (arguing that the doctrine under which insider trading is regu-
lated is seriously flawed). Further, "[n]either the words of section 10(b) nor the stat-
ute's legislative history manifest any Congressional intent to have the federal judiciary
interpret section 10(b) as enabling legislation for the formulation of judicial public
policy." Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 47, at 210. The Supreme Court has declared
that the creation of a new species of fraud under section 10(b) would "depart[ ] radi-
cally from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship be-
tween two parties ... [and] should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence
of congressional intent." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). Ascer-
tainment of legislative intent, according to the Court, must "rest primarily on the
language" of section 10(b). Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1997).
170. The "duty breached by persons found liable under the misappropriation the-
ory is different from the duty arising out of an insider's relationship to the corpora-
tion's shareholders." Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 132; see United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995). Cf SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("There is little question that the vague term 'fraud' as used in Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can encompass the misappropriation theory."); SEC v. Clark,
915 F.2d 439, 448-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "the misappropriation theory fits
comfortably" within "the notoriously vague" terms of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
171. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997).
172. Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 38, at 132. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737
F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that disclosure violates the client-doctor
privilege).
173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tion of it.174 The Supreme Court itself has ordered that the concept
of fraud in the securities context not be expanded beyond what the
words of the 1934 Act permit.175 It has also established that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not remedy every instance of undesirable
conduct involving securities,17 6 and that "[t]he language of § 10(b)
gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception.' '1 77
2. Misappropriation Theory Permits Liability Absent the "In
Connectioh With" Requirement
Generally, the courts that adopted the misappropriation theory
were also very lenient with respect to the requirement that the
fraud be committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' 78 The Supreme Court, in O'Hagan, explained that the
fraud is complete only when the information has been used in a
securities transaction.1 79 Because the fraud is not consummated
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but rather,
occurs when he uses it to purchase or sell securities without disclo-
sure, the nexus is necessarily present. 8 °
This principle, however, is a radical departure from the Court's
recent strict interpretation of the language of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 where it held that the "in connection with" requirement
was satisfied only when the fraud affects the financial marketplace
174. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit was the first
jurisdiction to break ranks and find that the misappropriation theory is irreconcilable
with Supreme Court precedent. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944. The court found it troub-
lesome that the "fraud" requirement is met when a person misappropriates material,
nonpublic information in breach of some special duty, even if the source of the infor-
mation is neither a purchaser or seller of securities, nor in any way connected to the
purchase or sale of securities. See id.
175. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
174 (1994).
176. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977)).
177. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473; see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Santa Fe.
178. See, e.g., Clark, 915 F.2d at 449 ("[T]he question here is whether there is some
nexus between [the defendant's] misappropriation of ... confidential information
and any securities transaction."). For example, in United States v. Newman, even
though the fraud was not against a purchaser or seller of securities, the court held that
the "in connection with" requirement was met since Newman's "sole purpose" in mis-
appropriating the information was to purchase stock in the target companies. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 74-76 and accompa-
nying text.
179. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
180. See id.
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and the victim is a defrauded purchaser or seller.'81 As the dissent
in O'Hagan pointed out, the misappropriation theory should not
cover cases involving fraud on the source of information where the
source has no connection with the other participant in a securities
transaction. 1
82
3. Congress Should Intervene with a Statute
Few would argue that James O'Hagan's behavior was not repre-
hensible and should go unpunished. 83 The misappropriation the-
ory, however, may not be so easy to accept when the conduct
amounts to no more than a breach of an employment contract, 184
breach of the psychiatrist-patient confidence, 85 failure to keep
nonpublic business information within the family, 86 or basic theft
and burglary. 87 The appeal for redress is understandable when in-
formation is misappropriated and used to trade on the securities
markets. Although there may be a need for federal standards to
protect investors against the mishandling of material, nonpublic in-
formation, the Supreme Court has instructed that such standards
"should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.' 188
Instead, Congress should intervene to finally resolve this issue by
creating a statute which clearly and directly addresses liability for
insider trading. Professor Jill Fisch offers a unique proposal that
181. See Fisch, supra note 12, at 195 (analyzing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975)).
182. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2223 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
noted that O'Hagan could have done a number of things with the information he
acquired: "He could have sold it to a newspaper for publication, he could have given
or sold the information to Pillsbury itself, or he could even have kept the information
and used it solely for his personal amusement, perhaps in a fantasy stock trading
game." Id. (internal citations omitted). The fact that he chose to purchase securities
based on the information "is thus no more significant here than it is in the case of
embezzling money used to purchase securities." Id.; see supra note 140 and accompa-
nying text.
183. In addition to purchasing securities based on information he had access to
through his employment at the law firm, O'Hagan allegedly used the profits gained
through this unlawful trading to conceal his previous embezzlement and conversion of
unrelated client trust funds. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
184. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d
Cir. 1981).
185. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
186. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991); United States
v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 705 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d
Cir. 1985).
187. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991).
188. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977) (internal citation omitted).
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would replace the concept of regulation based on the trader's fidu-
ciary duties with a system of regulation based on insider status.189
Specifically, Fisch's proposed statute defines two groups with in-
sider status: "primary insiders" and "secondary insiders," and re-
stricts these insiders from trading on information obtained by
virtue of their status. 190
By regulating the unlawful trading in the securities market
through explicit legislative action, Congress could respect the doc-
trine of the separation of powers. In addition, a congressional stat-
ute, such as the one proposed by Professor Fisch, can better resolve
the problems of unlawful trading because it equips the courts with
a clear standard that can easily be applied whenever there in an
allegation of unlawful trading.
The misappropriation theory, adopted by O'Hagan, shifts the fo-
cus of section 10(b) from protecting investors in the securities mar-
ket to protecting the sources of confidential information. Even the
scant evidence of legislative history makes clear that this was not
the purpose of the statute. Therefore, the misappropriation theory
not only goes beyond the text of the statute, but it also reaches
beyond the underlying purpose of the statute.
Moreover, the misappropriation theory makes potential liability
less predictable under section 10(b), 19 1 and the O'Hagan decision
does nothing to alleviate the problem. When addressed with this
problem in the past, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
189. Fisch, supra note 12, at 238-39.
190. Primary insiders include those who have "(1) the ability to affect the content
and timing of corporate disclosure; (2) regular access to information on significant
corporate events; and (3) the ability to affect the decisionmaking process about such
events." Id. at 240-41. "Secondary insiders are those who by virtue of an employment
or other contractual relationship receive nonpublic information relating to the issuer
or its securities for the purpose of advising or rendering services to the corporation or
its management." Id. at 241. Under her proposed statute, primary insiders who, due
to their status as an insider, possess material, nonpublic information relative to any
security, are prohibited from taking advantage of that information by tipping or trad-
ing. See id. at 242. Secondary insiders are prohibited from taking advantage of mate-
rial, nonpublic information relative to any security, obtained by their relationship with
the corporation. See id. Further, "tippee trading would be regulated indirectly by
requiring tippers to be responsible for the economic consequences of tippee trading."
Id. at 247-48.
191. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951 ("It would be difficult to overstate the uncertainty
that has been introduced into the already uncertain law governing fraudulent securi-
ties transactions through adoption of the misappropriation theory, with its linchpin
the breach of a fiduciary duty."); see also Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567, ("Our Rule 10b-
5 precedents under the misappropriation theory ... provide little guidance with re-
spect to the question of fiduciary breach, because they involved egregious fiduciary
breaches arising solely in the context of employer/employee associations.").
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securities market "'demands certainty and predictability,' 1 92 and
that it is "essential ... to have a guiding principle for those whose
daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's insider-
trading rules.' 93 While it is not difficult to argue that James
O'Hagan breached a fiduciary duty, in several cases where courts
have imposed liability under the misappropriation theory, the
breach has not been so clear. 194 Unlike the misappropriation the-
ory, a congressional statute would provide the certainty and pre-
dictability needed to regulate this area.
Finally, although Professor Fisch argues that insider trading
should not be criminalized, 195 civil penalties alone will not provide
sufficient deterrence for those with access to valuable market infor-
mation. If insiders are required merely to disgorge profits when
they are caught illegally taking advantage of material, nonpublic
information, it may be worth their risk to continue such unlawful
activity. Rogue investors attempting to trade on misappropriated
information will have an incentive to keep trying until they eventu-
ally are successful. Accordingly, there should be criminal penalties
for this type of unlawful insider trading, consisting of harsh fines
and imprisonment.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court should interpret section 10(b) based on its
plain language in order to respect the role of Congress as
lawmaker, and its own role as interpreter of the law. In O'Hagan,
the Court improperly extended liability under section 10(b) to
reach a culpable defendant whose conduct was not covered by the
language of the statute or the rule. The courts, however, simply are
not competent to regulate in the complicated area of securities law.
192. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
193. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
194. For instance, the Second Circuit, in Chestman, struggled to define a line to
establish the necessary fiduciary relationship. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-71.
O'Hagan merely condoned the theory, without directing the courts as to the limits of
its application. The Bryan Court, which championed the fight against the misappro-
priation theory, stated that "although fifteen years have passed since the theory's in-
ception, no court adopting the misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis
for distinguishing which types of fiduciary or similar relationships of trust and confi-
dence can give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability and which cannot." Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951.
195. See Fisch, supra note 12, at 237-38 (suggesting that because "insider trading
cannot readily be equated with either stealing or lying ... classifying such trading as
criminal and penalizing it with stiff prison sentences should be reconsidered."). In-
stead, Fisch suggests insider trading be enforced by civil disgorgement. See id. at 251.
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Instead, Congress alone is responsible for making laws that will
punish people like James O'Hagan. Thus, Congress should draft a
statute that will protect market participants, rather than the
sources of market information, thereby serving the underlying pur-
pose of section 10(b).
